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Message-ID: <47B2A3F3.8060701@ak.jp.nec.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2008 17:01:55 +0900
From: Kohei KaiGai <kaigai@...jp.nec.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
CC: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>, akpm@...l.org,
jmorris@...ei.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] exporting capability code/name pairs (try #4)
Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Kohei KaiGai (kaigai@...jp.nec.com):
>> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
>> index 25ffe1b..b79e830 100644
>> --- a/security/Kconfig
>> +++ b/security/Kconfig
>> @@ -91,6 +91,15 @@ config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
>>
>> If in doubt, answer N.
>>
>> +config SECURITY_CAPABILITIES_EXPORT
>> + bool "Exporting capabilities kernel supported"
>> + depends on SECURITY_CAPABILITIES && SYSFS
>
> Oh no, we're being bit by this again... When SECURITY=n, capabilities
> are compiled in but SECURITY_CAPABILITIES=n.
>
> Months ago I floated the following patch so we'd have a CONFIG variable
> to let us know whether commoncap is compiled in. You might want to use
> this and depend on CONFIG_COMMONCAP? (Though really I personally don't
> think you need your own config variable for this)
I also think its own config variable is not necessary to turn on/off
exporting the list of capabilities in actually.
Do you want this feture to be moved into security/commoncap.c and
enabled unconditionally? I can agree this suggestion.
Is there any complaint for this idea?
Thanks,
> Other than that, this tested fine for me.
>
> thanks,
> -serge
>
>>>From 54c70ca7671750fe8986451fae91d42107d0ca90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
> Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2007 10:33:33 -0500
> Subject: [PATCH 1/2] capabilities: define CONFIG_COMMONCAP
>
> currently the compilation of commoncap.c is determined
> through Makefile logic. So there is no single CONFIG
> variable which can be relied upon to know whether it
> will be compiled.
>
> Define CONFIG_COMMONCAP to be true when lsm is not
> compiled in, or when the capability or rootplug modules
> are compiled. These are the cases when commoncap is
> currently compiled. Use this variable in security/Makefile
> to determine commoncap.c's compilation.
>
> Apart from being a logic cleanup, this is needed by the
> upcoming cap_bset patch so that prctl can know whether
> PR_SET_BSET should be allowed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
> ---
> security/Kconfig | 4 ++++
> security/Makefile | 9 +++------
> 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 8086e61..02b33fa 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
>
> If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>
> +config COMMONCAP
> + bool
> + default !SECURITY || SECURITY_CAPABILITIES || SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
> +
> source security/selinux/Kconfig
>
> endmenu
> diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
> index ef87df2..7cccc81 100644
> --- a/security/Makefile
> +++ b/security/Makefile
> @@ -5,14 +5,11 @@
> obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/
> subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
>
> -# if we don't select a security model, use the default capabilities
> -ifneq ($(CONFIG_SECURITY),y)
> -obj-y += commoncap.o
> -endif
> +obj-$(CONFIG_COMMONCAP) += commoncap.o
>
> # Object file lists
> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o dummy.o inode.o
> # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o
> -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES) += commoncap.o capability.o
> -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += commoncap.o root_plug.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES) += capability.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += root_plug.o
--
OSS Platform Development Division, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...jp.nec.com>
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