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Message-Id: <1204919172.1397.541.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 14:46:12 -0500
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...nvz.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, menage@...gle.com, sukadev@...ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/9] Make use of permissions, returned by kobj_lookup
On Fri, 2008-03-07 at 12:30 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Casey Schaufler (casey@...aufler-ca.com):
> >
> > --- "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > > ...
> > >
> > > Until user namespaces are complete, selinux seems the only good solution
> > > to offer isolation.
> >
> > Smack does it better and cheaper. (Unless you define good==selinux)
> > (insert smiley)
>
> Ah, thanks - I hadn't looked into it, but yes IIUC smack should
> definately work. I'll have to give that a shot.
Not if you want to confine uid 0. smack doesn't control capabilities,
even the ones used to override it.
So you'd have to at least configure your per-process bset and file caps
rather carefully. And even then you have to watch out for things with
CAP_MAC* or CAP_SETPCAP.
> (A basic selinux policy module to isolate a container was pretty simple,
> but providing finer-grained intra-container access seems to take some
> changes to the base refpolicy. I've been waiting a few weeks to find
> time to work on that.)
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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