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Message-ID: <26315.23145.qm@web36606.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 12:57:42 -0800 (PST)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...nvz.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, menage@...gle.com, sukadev@...ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/9] Make use of permissions, returned by kobj_lookup
--- Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 2008-03-07 at 12:30 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Casey Schaufler (casey@...aufler-ca.com):
> > >
> > > --- "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > ...
> > > >
> > > > Until user namespaces are complete, selinux seems the only good
> solution
> > > > to offer isolation.
> > >
> > > Smack does it better and cheaper. (Unless you define good==selinux)
> > > (insert smiley)
> >
> > Ah, thanks - I hadn't looked into it, but yes IIUC smack should
> > definately work. I'll have to give that a shot.
>
> Not if you want to confine uid 0. smack doesn't control capabilities,
> even the ones used to override it.
>
> So you'd have to at least configure your per-process bset and file caps
> rather carefully. And even then you have to watch out for things with
> CAP_MAC* or CAP_SETPCAP.
Shrug. As if getting 800,000 lines of policy definition
for a thousand applications completely correct is going to be easier.
Casey Schaufler
casey@...aufler-ca.com
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