linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] ptrace: it is fun to strace /sbin/init

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Message-ID: <20080325180611.GB19176@sergelap.ibm.com>
Date:	Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:06:11 -0500
From:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To:	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...sign.ru>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...nvz.org>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
	Andrew Morgan <morgan@...nel.org>,
	Linux Containers <containers@...ts.osdl.org>,
	Herbert Poetzl <herbert@...hfloor.at>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ptrace: it is fun to strace /sbin/init

Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@...ho.nsa.gov):
> 
> On Tue, 2008-03-25 at 08:40 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@...ho.nsa.gov):
> > > 
> > > On Tue, 2008-03-25 at 02:04 +0300, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> > > > On 03/24, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > /sbin/init is important, but there are other important (and sometimes
> > > > > > much more important) services. Why it is so special so that we can't
> > > > > > debug/strace it?
> > > > > 
> > > > > Maybe. Let's kill /sbin/init protection in 2.6.26. But making it
> > > > > optional is wrong.
> > > > 
> > > > You are right, the boot parameter is silly. How about sysctl?
> > > > 
> > > > Stephen, do you see any security problems if we make /sbin/init
> > > > ptraceable by default?
> > > 
> > > Not an issue for SELinux (we apply an orthogonal check based on security
> > > context, so we can already block ptrace of init independent of whether
> > > root/CAP_SYS_PTRACE can do it).  I'm not sure though as to whether
> > > people using capabilities have ever relied on this special protection of
> > > init (e.g. custom init spawns children with lesser capabilities and
> > > relies on the fact that they cannot ptrace init to effectively re-gain
> > > those capabilities, even if they possess CAP_SYS_PTRACE).
> > 
> > Still thinking it through, but it seems like special casing init isn't
> > useful.  There are likely to be other tasks with all capabilities
> > set which the malicious task could just as well ptrace to do his
> > mischief, right?
> 
> Depends on the bounding set.  Didn't it used to be the case that only
> init had CAP_SETPCAP (until the meaning of it was changed by the
> filesystem capability support)?

Not quite.  CAP_SETPCAP was taken out of everyone's bounding set.  But
kernel/sysctl.c allowed only init to add capabilities to the bounding
set.  (Whereas CAP_SYS_MODULE was sufficient to remove them).

> Might want to double check with e.g. the vservers folks that they
> weren't relying in any way on special handling of init.

Herbert, Pavel, do you have objections to allowing ptrace of init?
(I believe Eric has already Acked the idea iirc?)

thanks,
-serge
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