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Message-Id: <1207747586.21223.413.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
Date: Wed, 09 Apr 2008 09:26:26 -0400
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To: Matthew Wilcox <matthew@....cx>
Cc: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@...data.co.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul.moore@...com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@...data.co.jp>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [TOMOYO #7 30/30] Hooks for SAKURA and TOMOYO.
On Wed, 2008-04-09 at 07:11 -0600, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 09, 2008 at 05:37:38PM +0900, Toshiharu Harada wrote:
> > LWN article 239962 says, "At the 2006 summit, Linus took a clear
> > position that the use of pathnames for security policies seemed
> > reasonable to him". Current LSM implementation is sufficient for SELinux
> > and other label based MACs but not for pathname-based MACs.
> > This has been argued in the AppAmor thread for quite a long time.
> > Though proposals had been posted by AppArmor and TOMOYO Linux project,
> > none has been merged until now.
>
> How about an approach which doesn't require the vfsmount to be passed
> down?
>
> When the rule is put in place, say "No modifications to /etc/passwd",
> look up the inode and major:minor of /etc/passwd. If there's a rename,
> look up the new inode number. If it's mounted elsewhere, it doesn't
> matter, they still can't modify it because it has the same
> major:minor:inode.
>
> Is this workable?
Sounds similar to audit watches, e.g. see audit_add_watch() and
audit_handle_ievent(). That leverages inotify internally.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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