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Message-Id: <20080415002918.6a3b40b6.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2008 00:29:18 -0700
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Erik Bosman <ebn310@....vu.nl>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@...share.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] x86: Implement prctl PR_GET_TSC and PR_SET_TSC
On Fri, 11 Apr 2008 18:55:58 +0200 (CEST) Erik Bosman <ebn310@....vu.nl> wrote:
>
> x86: Implement prctl PR_GET_TSC and PR_SET_TSC
>
> This patch adds a configure option CONFIG_DISABLE_TSC
> (off by default) for the x86 platform to enable the
> PR_GET_TSC and PR_SET_TSC commands. These control the
> ability to use the timestamp counter from userspace
> (the RDTSC instruction.)
>
> This patch uses code earlier used to disable the
> timestamp counter for the SECCOMP framework. It used
> to disable the RDTSC on 32 bit kernels, but allow it
> on x86_64. This patch makes SECCOMP disable the
> timestamp counter whenever CONFIG_DISABLE_TSC is
> enabled.
>
> ...
>
> +config DISABLE_TSC
> + def_bool n
> + prompt "Make availability of the RDTSC instruction configurable"
> + depends on (X86_32 || X86_64) && EXPERIMENTAL
> + help
> + While the RDTSC instruction allows for very precise time
> + measurements, it is also a source for non-determinism
> + during the execution of a process which can be a problem in some
> + security contexts. This option adds prctl commands to configure
> + and test the availability of the RDTSC instruction on a
> + per-process basis. Choosing this option may cause a small
> + performance hit during context switching.
> +
> + If unsure, say N.
> +
> config SECCOMP
> def_bool y
> prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
> index 6496344..e6a861f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
> @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
> #include <linux/personality.h>
> #include <linux/tick.h>
> #include <linux/percpu.h>
> +#include <linux/prctl.h>
>
> #include <asm/uaccess.h>
> #include <asm/pgtable.h>
> @@ -528,11 +529,12 @@ start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip, unsigned long new_sp)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(start_thread);
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
> +#ifdef CONFIG_DISABLE_TSC
> static void hard_disable_TSC(void)
> {
> write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_TSD);
> }
Won't this break this build if CONFIG_DISABLE_TSC=n and CONFIG_SECCOMP=y?
The prctl.h and sys.c parts look OK to me. I'll consider this a git-x86
patch.
--
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