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Message-Id: <200804241940.m3OJe32l030977@agora.fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2008 15:40:03 -0400
From: Erez Zadok <ezk@...sunysb.edu>
To: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Erez Zadok <ezk@...sunysb.edu>, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
dave@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, mhalcrow@...ibm.com,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 00/13] vfs: add helpers to check r/o bind mounts
In message <20080424181332.GB5882@...IV.linux.org.uk>, Al Viro writes:
> On Thu, Apr 24, 2008 at 01:29:49PM -0400, Erez Zadok wrote:
> > In message <20080424142857.GF15214@...IV.linux.org.uk>, Al Viro writes:
> > > On Thu, Apr 24, 2008 at 04:09:18PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > [...]
> > > FWIW, I'm not all that happy about the way ecryptfs_interpose() is done,
> > > while we are at it. We get the sucker opened by whoever steps on given
> > > place in the tree first, with subsequent operations done using the resulting
> > > struct file. With fallback to r/o open. What happens to somebody who
> > > tries to open it with enough permissions to do r/w?
> >
> > Yes, ecryptfs_interpose() calls ecryptfs_init_persistent_file() which calls
> > dentry_open(O_RDWR). What's the proposed solution for this in the face of
> > r/o vfsmounts? How could ecryptfs avoid calling this dentry_open in the
> > first place?
>
> Doesn't have anything to do with vfsmounts (you have one to deal with and
> if it's r/o, it's equivalent to just doing the entire thing on top of r/o
> fs; not interesting).
>
> No, what I'm worried about is much simpler. Look: we have a file on
> underlying fs, owned by root.root with 644 for permissions. Comes a
> luser and tries to open the counterpart of that file in ecryptfs; that
> triggers ecryptfs_interpose() and attempts to open file. Of course,
> that's going to fail - it's not world-writable. So then it (actually
> ecryptfs_init_persistent_file()) falls back to opening with O_RDONLY.
> Which succeeds just fine and file (opened r/o) is set as ->lower_file.
>
> Now comes root and tries to open the damn thing r/w. It should be able
> to and if it came first it'd get it; as it is, what it gets is ->lower_file
> and that puppy is opened read-only and you have no guarantee that underlying
> fs will not go bonkers seeing write attempts on it (e.g. open for write
> doing a bit more setup of ->private_data, etc.).
Ah, I see. Yes: ecryptfs_init_persistent_file does have this odd "try to
open readwrite and if that failed, try readonly" code there. I can't really
say why it's done that way: Mike? Maybe it was a workaround to not having
the right permissions to open that persistent file?
This could be a similar issue to how I had to handle the .wh.* files in
unionfs. Because they are separate files, and they get created/destroyed
directly by unionfs, I cannot rely on the caller's capabilities to be able
to create/remove these .wh.* files. So in several places I have to call
cap_raise temporarily. (Of course, if/when there'd be native whiteout
support in the most most common file systems, I could happily rip out this
whiteout code. :-)
Erez.
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