linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach

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Date:	Thu, 15 May 2008 12:25:34 -0700 (PDT)
From:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	lsm <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc:	lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] security:  split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach


--- Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:

> Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
> proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
> ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
> read access or full attach access is requested.  This allows security
> modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
> full ptrace access.  The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.
> 
> Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
> check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
> to already be ptracing the target.  The other ptrace checks within
> proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
> read mode instead of attach.
> 
> In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
> reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label.  This
> enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
> permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
> a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
> but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
> lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit).  At present we have to choose between
> allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
> or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
> via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).
> 
> This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
> (change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
> mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).

Looks better to me.


Casey Schaufler
casey@...aufler-ca.com
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