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Message-ID: <20080911104323.GB23775@wotan.suse.de>
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 12:43:23 +0200
From: Nick Piggin <npiggin@...e.de>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [patch] x86: some lock annotations for user copy paths
On Thu, Sep 11, 2008 at 10:27:10AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Nick Piggin <npiggin@...e.de> wrote:
>
> > On Wed, Sep 10, 2008 at 05:01:04PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > > extern struct atomic_notifier_head panic_notifier_list;
> > > > extern long (*panic_blink)(long time);
> > > > NORET_TYPE void panic(const char * fmt, ...)
> > >
> > > This forgets that in_atomic() again - possibly triggering might_sleep()
> > > where not appropriate.
> > >
> > > I'm not sure its worth it to out-of-line the thing though (its only big
> > > on debug builds), and CONFIG_LOCKDEP is the wrong CONFIG_* variable, I
> > > think CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING would be the appropriate one.
> >
> > OK, last attempt. If this breaks, then I give up for the day :)
>
> i've tidied it up a bit:
>
> - moved the might_sleep() check outside the in_atomic() check,
Hmm... but then it has the same failure case again in the is_preempt()
code, does it not?
I guess we should just convert that guy to either use get_user_atomic,
(which would mean implementing that for x86), or use copy_from_user_inatomic.
> - fixed a spelling mistake
> - fixed a build error on !LOCKDEP
> - changed the CONFIG_LOCKDEP dependency to CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
Thanks.
> and it's working fine on most boxes. One testbox found this new locking
> scenario:
>
> PM: Adding info for No Bus:vcsa7
> EDAC DEBUG: MC0: i82860_check()
>
> =======================================================
> [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
> 2.6.27-rc6-tip #1
> -------------------------------------------------------
> X/4873 is trying to acquire lock:
> (&bb->mutex){--..}, at: [<c020ba20>] mmap+0x40/0xa0
>
> but task is already holding lock:
> (&mm->mmap_sem){----}, at: [<c0125a1e>] sys_mmap2+0x8e/0xc0
>
> which lock already depends on the new lock.
>
>
> the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
>
> -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){----}:
> [<c017dc96>] validate_chain+0xa96/0xf50
> [<c017ef2b>] __lock_acquire+0x2cb/0x5b0
> [<c017f299>] lock_acquire+0x89/0xc0
> [<c01aa8fb>] might_fault+0x6b/0x90
> [<c040b618>] copy_to_user+0x38/0x60
> [<c020bcfb>] read+0xfb/0x170
> [<c01c09a5>] vfs_read+0x95/0x110
> [<c01c1443>] sys_pread64+0x63/0x80
> [<c012146f>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x43
> [<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff
>
> -> #0 (&bb->mutex){--..}:
> [<c017d8b7>] validate_chain+0x6b7/0xf50
> [<c017ef2b>] __lock_acquire+0x2cb/0x5b0
> [<c017f299>] lock_acquire+0x89/0xc0
> [<c0d6f2ab>] __mutex_lock_common+0xab/0x3c0
> [<c0d6f698>] mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x50
> [<c020ba20>] mmap+0x40/0xa0
> [<c01b111e>] mmap_region+0x14e/0x450
> [<c01b170f>] do_mmap_pgoff+0x2ef/0x310
> [<c0125a3d>] sys_mmap2+0xad/0xc0
> [<c012146f>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x43
> [<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff
>
> other info that might help us debug this:
>
> 1 lock held by X/4873:
> #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){----}, at: [<c0125a1e>] sys_mmap2+0x8e/0xc0
>
> stack backtrace:
> Pid: 4873, comm: X Not tainted 2.6.27-rc6-tip #1
> [<c017cd09>] print_circular_bug_tail+0x79/0xc0
> [<c017d8b7>] validate_chain+0x6b7/0xf50
> [<c017a5b5>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x15/0xb0
> [<c017ef2b>] __lock_acquire+0x2cb/0x5b0
> [<c017f299>] lock_acquire+0x89/0xc0
> [<c020ba20>] ? mmap+0x40/0xa0
> [<c0d6f2ab>] __mutex_lock_common+0xab/0x3c0
> [<c020ba20>] ? mmap+0x40/0xa0
> [<c0d6f698>] mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x50
> [<c020ba20>] ? mmap+0x40/0xa0
> [<c020ba20>] mmap+0x40/0xa0
> [<c01b111e>] mmap_region+0x14e/0x450
> [<c01afb88>] ? arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown+0xf8/0x160
> [<c01b170f>] do_mmap_pgoff+0x2ef/0x310
> [<c0125a3d>] sys_mmap2+0xad/0xc0
> [<c012146f>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x43
> [<c0120000>] ? __switch_to+0x130/0x220
> =======================
> evbug.c: Event. Dev: input3, Type: 20, Code: 0, Value: 500
> warning: `sudo' uses deprecated v2 capabilities in a way that may be insecure.
>
> i've attached the config.
>
> at first sight it looks like a genuine bug in fs/sysfs/bin.c?
Yes, it is a real bug by the looks. bin.c takes bb->mutex under mmap_sem
when it is mmapped, and then does its copy_*_user under bb->mutex too.
> i.e. your patches are working as expected and the extended validation
> mechanism is finding real bugs :-)
Yeah it's nice. I'm just hoping we don't come across one that is as
difficult to fix as prepare_write/commit_write were ;)
Here is a basic fix for the sysfs lor.
---
Index: linux-2.6/fs/sysfs/bin.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.orig/fs/sysfs/bin.c
+++ linux-2.6/fs/sysfs/bin.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ read(struct file *file, char __user *use
int size = dentry->d_inode->i_size;
loff_t offs = *off;
int count = min_t(size_t, bytes, PAGE_SIZE);
+ char *temp;
if (size) {
if (offs > size)
@@ -69,23 +70,33 @@ read(struct file *file, char __user *use
count = size - offs;
}
+ temp = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!temp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
mutex_lock(&bb->mutex);
count = fill_read(dentry, bb->buffer, offs, count);
- if (count < 0)
- goto out_unlock;
+ if (count < 0) {
+ mutex_unlock(&bb->mutex);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
- if (copy_to_user(userbuf, bb->buffer, count)) {
+ memcpy(temp, bb->buffer, count);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&bb->mutex);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(userbuf, temp, count)) {
count = -EFAULT;
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out_free;
}
pr_debug("offs = %lld, *off = %lld, count = %d\n", offs, *off, count);
*off = offs + count;
- out_unlock:
- mutex_unlock(&bb->mutex);
+ out_free:
+ kfree(temp);
return count;
}
@@ -118,6 +129,7 @@ static ssize_t write(struct file *file,
int size = dentry->d_inode->i_size;
loff_t offs = *off;
int count = min_t(size_t, bytes, PAGE_SIZE);
+ char *temp;
if (size) {
if (offs > size)
@@ -126,19 +138,27 @@ static ssize_t write(struct file *file,
count = size - offs;
}
- mutex_lock(&bb->mutex);
+ temp = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!temp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- if (copy_from_user(bb->buffer, userbuf, count)) {
+ if (copy_from_user(temp, userbuf, count)) {
count = -EFAULT;
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out_free;
}
+ mutex_lock(&bb->mutex);
+
+ memcpy(bb->buffer, temp, count);
+
count = flush_write(dentry, bb->buffer, offs, count);
+ mutex_unlock(&bb->mutex);
+
if (count > 0)
*off = offs + count;
- out_unlock:
- mutex_unlock(&bb->mutex);
+out_free:
+ kfree(temp);
return count;
}
--
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