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Message-ID: <20080912092411.GB10305@elte.hu>
Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2008 11:24:11 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Nick Piggin <npiggin@...e.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...e.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH] sysfs: fix deadlock
[ Greg, please see the sysfs fix further below. ]
* Nick Piggin <npiggin@...e.de> wrote:
> > - moved the might_sleep() check outside the in_atomic() check,
>
> Hmm... but then it has the same failure case again in the is_preempt()
> code, does it not?
>
> I guess we should just convert that guy to either use get_user_atomic,
> (which would mean implementing that for x86), or use
> copy_from_user_inatomic.
i've done the v3 patch below - that seems to have passed all my testing
without any new bugs found. I've reinstated your the clear_user()
might_fault() check, plus i removed it from __[get|put]_user_size, which
the _inatomic() API variants use. That enabled me to utilize the
_inatomic() API in probe_kernel_address().
we still have the checks in put_user()/get_user() and in all the
copy_*_user() APIs, which should be strong enough. [ I havent fully
checked whether __get_user_size() might be used by some less frequent
API - if it is then that API should grow a might_fault() check. ]
> > i've attached the config.
> >
> > at first sight it looks like a genuine bug in fs/sysfs/bin.c?
>
> Yes, it is a real bug by the looks. bin.c takes bb->mutex under
> mmap_sem when it is mmapped, and then does its copy_*_user under
> bb->mutex too.
ok - second patch attached below, Greg, could you please apply? This is
for v2.6.27 too i think.
> > i.e. your patches are working as expected and the extended
> > validation mechanism is finding real bugs :-)
>
> Yeah it's nice. I'm just hoping we don't come across one that is as
> difficult to fix as prepare_write/commit_write were ;)
>
> Here is a basic fix for the sysfs lor.
and that did the trick here - the patch with a tidied up changelog is
attached further below. [ the second patch is standalone and does not
need the first patch which is relative to tip/master ]
thanks Nick, i think this is a great addition to lockdep! It already
found two real locking bugs within a day. If you can think of any other
proactive methods to widen our lock hierarchy knowledge that would be
great to add. I think what we want is to insert knowledge about other
unlikely lock acquire events, for locks that have a historic pattern of
producing regular locking bugs.
Ingo
----------------->
>From 1d18ef489509314506328b9e464dd47c24c1d68f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 20:53:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86: some lock annotations for user copy paths, v3
- add annotation back to clear_user()
- change probe_kernel_address() to _inatomic*() method
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
---
arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 1 +
include/asm-x86/uaccess.h | 2 --
include/linux/uaccess.h | 2 +-
3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
index 7393152..fab5fab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ do { \
unsigned long
clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
{
+ might_fault();
if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
__do_clear_user(to, n);
return n;
diff --git a/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h b/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h
index 39f8420..dc8edb5 100644
--- a/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h
+++ b/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h
@@ -267,7 +267,6 @@ extern void __put_user_8(void);
#define __put_user_size(x, ptr, size, retval, errret) \
do { \
retval = 0; \
- might_fault(); \
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
switch (size) { \
case 1: \
@@ -320,7 +319,6 @@ do { \
#define __get_user_size(x, ptr, size, retval, errret) \
do { \
retval = 0; \
- might_fault(); \
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
switch (size) { \
case 1: \
diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
index fec6dec..2062293 100644
--- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
+++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __copy_from_user_nocache(void *to,
\
set_fs(KERNEL_DS); \
pagefault_disable(); \
- ret = __get_user(retval, (__force typeof(retval) __user *)(addr)); \
+ ret = __copy_from_user_inatomic((__force typeof(retval) __user *)(addr), &(retval), sizeof(retval)); \
pagefault_enable(); \
set_fs(old_fs); \
ret; \
------------------->
>From 13f37e1febb1990ae5cabc53eeee1e78198376ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nick Piggin <npiggin@...e.de>
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 12:43:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] sysfs: fix deadlock
On Thu, Sep 11, 2008 at 10:27:10AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> and it's working fine on most boxes. One testbox found this new locking
> scenario:
>
> PM: Adding info for No Bus:vcsa7
> EDAC DEBUG: MC0: i82860_check()
>
> =======================================================
> [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
> 2.6.27-rc6-tip #1
> -------------------------------------------------------
> X/4873 is trying to acquire lock:
> (&bb->mutex){--..}, at: [<c020ba20>] mmap+0x40/0xa0
>
> but task is already holding lock:
> (&mm->mmap_sem){----}, at: [<c0125a1e>] sys_mmap2+0x8e/0xc0
>
> which lock already depends on the new lock.
>
>
> the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
>
> -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){----}:
> [<c017dc96>] validate_chain+0xa96/0xf50
> [<c017ef2b>] __lock_acquire+0x2cb/0x5b0
> [<c017f299>] lock_acquire+0x89/0xc0
> [<c01aa8fb>] might_fault+0x6b/0x90
> [<c040b618>] copy_to_user+0x38/0x60
> [<c020bcfb>] read+0xfb/0x170
> [<c01c09a5>] vfs_read+0x95/0x110
> [<c01c1443>] sys_pread64+0x63/0x80
> [<c012146f>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x43
> [<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff
>
> -> #0 (&bb->mutex){--..}:
> [<c017d8b7>] validate_chain+0x6b7/0xf50
> [<c017ef2b>] __lock_acquire+0x2cb/0x5b0
> [<c017f299>] lock_acquire+0x89/0xc0
> [<c0d6f2ab>] __mutex_lock_common+0xab/0x3c0
> [<c0d6f698>] mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x50
> [<c020ba20>] mmap+0x40/0xa0
> [<c01b111e>] mmap_region+0x14e/0x450
> [<c01b170f>] do_mmap_pgoff+0x2ef/0x310
> [<c0125a3d>] sys_mmap2+0xad/0xc0
> [<c012146f>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x43
> [<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff
>
> other info that might help us debug this:
>
> 1 lock held by X/4873:
> #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){----}, at: [<c0125a1e>] sys_mmap2+0x8e/0xc0
>
> stack backtrace:
> Pid: 4873, comm: X Not tainted 2.6.27-rc6-tip #1
> [<c017cd09>] print_circular_bug_tail+0x79/0xc0
> [<c017d8b7>] validate_chain+0x6b7/0xf50
> [<c017a5b5>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x15/0xb0
> [<c017ef2b>] __lock_acquire+0x2cb/0x5b0
> [<c017f299>] lock_acquire+0x89/0xc0
> [<c020ba20>] ? mmap+0x40/0xa0
> [<c0d6f2ab>] __mutex_lock_common+0xab/0x3c0
> [<c020ba20>] ? mmap+0x40/0xa0
> [<c0d6f698>] mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x50
> [<c020ba20>] ? mmap+0x40/0xa0
> [<c020ba20>] mmap+0x40/0xa0
> [<c01b111e>] mmap_region+0x14e/0x450
> [<c01afb88>] ? arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown+0xf8/0x160
> [<c01b170f>] do_mmap_pgoff+0x2ef/0x310
> [<c0125a3d>] sys_mmap2+0xad/0xc0
> [<c012146f>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x43
> [<c0120000>] ? __switch_to+0x130/0x220
> =======================
> evbug.c: Event. Dev: input3, Type: 20, Code: 0, Value: 500
> warning: `sudo' uses deprecated v2 capabilities in a way that may be insecure.
>
> i've attached the config.
>
> at first sight it looks like a genuine bug in fs/sysfs/bin.c?
Yes, it is a real bug by the looks. bin.c takes bb->mutex under mmap_sem
when it is mmapped, and then does its copy_*_user under bb->mutex too.
Here is a basic fix for the sysfs lor.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
---
fs/sysfs/bin.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/bin.c b/fs/sysfs/bin.c
index 006fc64..66f6e58 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/bin.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/bin.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf, size_t bytes, loff_t *off)
int size = dentry->d_inode->i_size;
loff_t offs = *off;
int count = min_t(size_t, bytes, PAGE_SIZE);
+ char *temp;
if (size) {
if (offs > size)
@@ -69,23 +70,33 @@ read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf, size_t bytes, loff_t *off)
count = size - offs;
}
+ temp = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!temp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
mutex_lock(&bb->mutex);
count = fill_read(dentry, bb->buffer, offs, count);
- if (count < 0)
- goto out_unlock;
+ if (count < 0) {
+ mutex_unlock(&bb->mutex);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
- if (copy_to_user(userbuf, bb->buffer, count)) {
+ memcpy(temp, bb->buffer, count);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&bb->mutex);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(userbuf, temp, count)) {
count = -EFAULT;
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out_free;
}
pr_debug("offs = %lld, *off = %lld, count = %d\n", offs, *off, count);
*off = offs + count;
- out_unlock:
- mutex_unlock(&bb->mutex);
+ out_free:
+ kfree(temp);
return count;
}
@@ -118,6 +129,7 @@ static ssize_t write(struct file *file, const char __user *userbuf,
int size = dentry->d_inode->i_size;
loff_t offs = *off;
int count = min_t(size_t, bytes, PAGE_SIZE);
+ char *temp;
if (size) {
if (offs > size)
@@ -126,19 +138,27 @@ static ssize_t write(struct file *file, const char __user *userbuf,
count = size - offs;
}
- mutex_lock(&bb->mutex);
+ temp = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!temp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- if (copy_from_user(bb->buffer, userbuf, count)) {
+ if (copy_from_user(temp, userbuf, count)) {
count = -EFAULT;
- goto out_unlock;
+ goto out_free;
}
+ mutex_lock(&bb->mutex);
+
+ memcpy(bb->buffer, temp, count);
+
count = flush_write(dentry, bb->buffer, offs, count);
+ mutex_unlock(&bb->mutex);
+
if (count > 0)
*off = offs + count;
- out_unlock:
- mutex_unlock(&bb->mutex);
+out_free:
+ kfree(temp);
return count;
}
--
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