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Message-Id: <1226004746.8898.6.camel@norville.austin.ibm.com>
Date:	Thu, 06 Nov 2008 14:52:26 -0600
From:	Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	mhalcrow@...ux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc:	Pavel Machek <pavel@...e.cz>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@...il.com>,
	Eric Sandeen <sandeen@...hat.com>,
	Tyler C Hicks <tchicks@...ibm.com>,
	David Kleikamp <shaggy@...ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5] eCryptfs: Filename Encryption
On Thu, 2008-11-06 at 14:27 -0600, mhalcrow@...ux.vnet.ibm.com wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 05, 2008 at 04:57:54PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > On Tue 2008-11-04 15:37:54, Michael Halcrow wrote:
> > > This patchset implements filename encryption via a
> > > passphrase-derived mount-wide Filename Encryption Key (FNEK)
> > > specified as a mount parameter. Each encrypted filename has a
> > > fixed prefix indicating that eCryptfs should try to decrypt the
> > > filename. When eCryptfs encounters
> > 
> > That is 'interesting'. What happens if normal filename has that
> > prefix?
> 
> If the lower filename has the prefix but does not have a valid tag 70
> packet following the prefix, then eCryptfs will complain in the syslog
> and then pass through the lower filename as-is.
I'd recommend hiding this kind of syslog verbosity behind a debug config
option.  I think it would be very easy to create a DOS attack against
ecryptfs by putting all sorts of clever things in the lower file system.
-- 
David Kleikamp
IBM Linux Technology Center
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