linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH -v3 4/4] SELinux: use new cap

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Message-Id: <1226072290.16320.60.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
Date:	Fri, 07 Nov 2008 10:38:10 -0500
From:	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To:	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...eil.org,
	serue@...ibm.com, morgan@...nel.org, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
	esandeen@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH -v3 4/4] SELinux: use new cap_noaudit interface

On Fri, 2008-11-07 at 10:23 -0500, Eric Paris wrote:
> Currently SELinux jumps through some ugly hoops to not audit a capbility
> check when determining if a process has additional powers to override
> memory limits or when trying to read/write illegal file labels.  Use
> the new noaudit call instead.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>

Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>

> ---
> 
>  security/selinux/hooks.c |   19 ++-----------------
>  1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 0d4ee8c..d3fd051 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1978,16 +1978,8 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
>  static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
>  {
>  	int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
> -	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
> -
> -	rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> -	if (rc == 0)
> -		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
> -					  SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
> -					  CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
> -					  0,
> -					  NULL);
>  
> +	rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
>  	if (rc == 0)
>  		cap_sys_admin = 1;
>  
> @@ -2812,7 +2804,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
>  	u32 size;
>  	int error;
>  	char *context = NULL;
> -	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
>  	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
>  
>  	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
> @@ -2827,13 +2818,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
>  	 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
>  	 * in-core context value, not a denial.
>  	 */
> -	error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> -	if (!error)
> -		error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
> -					     SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
> -					     CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
> -					     0,
> -					     NULL);
> +	error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
>  	if (!error)
>  		error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
>  						      &size);
-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

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