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Message-ID: <003501c9b70a$6a809f20$3f81dd60$@com>
Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2009 15:52:50 -0700
From: "Hua Zhong" <hzhong@...il.com>
To: "'Ray Lee'" <ray-lk@...rabbit.org>
Cc: "'Theodore Tso'" <tytso@....edu>,
"'Linus Torvalds'" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"'Jens Axboe'" <jens.axboe@...cle.com>,
"'Linux Kernel Mailing List'" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH 0/8][RFC] IO latency/throughput fixes
> Security on an embedded device starts with controlling physical
> access. If they have access to the storage media all bets are off,
> whether it's data=ordered or not. (Access to the storage media is
> really what we're talking about here -- medical data, for example,
> hitting the platter before the metadata updates that then make that
> data unaccessible to other userspace processes.)
>
> Because *if* they have access to the media, they can replace any
> running code on that box, and your security is worthless.
>
> So no, I don't see how that's a valid argument.
The problem with security has nothing to do with embedded. It's
that when you commit metadata first and crash before you write
the data, then you get to see random blocks which might contain
sensitive information from other users.
Hua
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