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Message-ID: <20090507005016.GJ31071@waste.org>
Date: Wed, 6 May 2009 19:50:16 -0500
From: Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Jake Edge <jake@....net>, security@...nel.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>, mingo@...hat.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>, Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [Security] [PATCH] proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes
On Wed, May 06, 2009 at 12:57:17PM -0500, Matt Mackall wrote:
> On Wed, May 06, 2009 at 09:48:20AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >
> > Matt, are you willing to ack my suggested patch which adds history to the
> > mix? Did somebody test that? I have this memory of there being an
> > "exploit" program to show the non-randomness of the values, but I can't
> > recall details, and would really want to get a second opinion from
> > somebody who cares about PRNG's.
>
> I still don't like it. I bounced it off some folks on the adversarial
> side of things and they didn't think it looked strong enough either.
> Full MD5 collisions can be generated about as fast as they can be
> checked, which makes _reduced strength_ MD4 not much better than an
> LFSR in terms of attack potential. So I suggest we either:
>
> a) take my original patch
> b) respin your patch using at least SHA1 rather than halfMD4 and
> changing the name to get_random_u32
>
> If you'd prefer (b), I'll do the legwork.
I've done some basic benchmarks on the primitives here in userspace:
halfMD4 get_random_int: about .326us per call or 12.2MB/s
sha1 get_random_int: about .660us per call or 6.1MB/s
dd /dev/urandom: 3.6MB/s
So I think the SHA1 solution is quite competitive on the performance
front with far fewer concerns about its strength. I'll spin a proper
patch tomorrow.
--
Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time.
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