linux-kernel - Re: symlinks with permissions

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20091030140745.GC1481@ucw.cz>
Date:	Fri, 30 Oct 2009 15:07:45 +0100
From:	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc:	David Wagner <daw-news@...berkeley.edu>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: symlinks with permissions

Hi!


> > Perhaps take a look at Pavel's post describing the attack again?
> 
> Yeah, I did that. It still looks like the complaint is that
> /proc/8675309/fd/3 gives you the ability to gain RW access to
> an object for which you have RW access.
> 
> Look, with hard links and the various mount options available
> today you just can't count on setting the mode on a directory
> to completely protect the files that it references. Look carefully

Look again. I can count on paths if I can prevent mounts and
hardlinks. Mounts are irrelevant as they are root-only, and I was
checking for hardlinks.

> Now, ask me if I think that /proc/8675309/fd/3 is a good idea,
> and we'll have a different discussion, but from an old school

Cool, so we actually agree, and can drop this thread?
								Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/