[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20091030183559.GF7008@elf.ucw.cz>
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2009 19:35:59 +0100
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@....uio.no>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
jamie@...reable.org
Subject: Re: symlinks with permissions
Hi!
> > Basically, that follow link should behave as dup(), not as open().
>
> There are reasons why an open is an open here. I don't remember the
> details but I found the archive of that conversation once. Maybe it was
> just technical limitations of the time.
That would be really really useful to bring
> >> I certainly am not interested in debugging or maintaining the stacking
> >> inode code that would be necessary to close this theoretical corner
> >> case. There are much more real bugs that need attention.
> >
> > But if we can get trivial 10-liner, that should be acceptable, right?
>
> How many linux shell scripts and other applications that use /dev/fd/N
> or /proc/self/fd/N will you be breaking?
Zero. (Well unless someone is exploiting it in wild).
> Closing a theoretical security hole at the expense of breaking real
> applications is a show stopper.
I don't plan to remove /proc/*/fd; but I would like it to behave like
dup().
(I still hope some security team does work for me :-).
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists