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Message-ID: <24998.1261111438@localhost>
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2009 23:43:58 -0500
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To: Michael Stone <michael@...top.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mrs@...hic-beasts.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, David Lang <david@...g.hm>,
Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@...il.com>,
Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@...emap.net>,
"C. Scott Ananian" <cscott@...ott.net>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Bernie Innocenti <bernie@...ewiz.org>,
Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@...cle.com>,
Américo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] Security: Add prctl(PR_{GET,SET}_NETWORK) interface. (v2)
On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 22:29:57 EST, Michael Stone said:
> Daniel Bernstein has observed [1] that security-conscious userland processes
> may benefit from the ability to irrevocably remove their ability to create,
> bind, connect to, or send messages except in the case of previously connected
> sockets or AF_UNIX filesystem sockets. We provide this facility by implementing
> support for a new prctl(PR_SET_NETWORK) flag named PR_NETWORK_OFF.
Dan does indeed have a point - but is this better achieved via either
the already-existing LSM interfaces (opening the stacking-LSM can of worms
again), or the SECCOMP framework? We already have 2 other ways to turn off
stuff, do we really want a third way?
Alternatively, could a more generalized prctl interface be leveraged to handle
SECCOMP, and/or other targeted things that want to stack with LSM?
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