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Message-ID: <20100118193004.GA17189@us.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2010 13:30:04 -0600
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>
Cc: Michael Stone <michael@...top.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, David Lang <david@...g.hm>,
Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>,
Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@...il.com>,
Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@...emap.net>,
"C. Scott Ananian" <cscott@...ott.net>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Bernie Innocenti <bernie@...ewiz.org>,
Mark Seaborn <mrs@...hic-beasts.com>,
Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@...cle.com>,
Américo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Samir Bellabes <sam@...ack.fr>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Kyle Moffett <kyle@...fetthome.net>
Subject: Re: disablenetwork (v5): Require CAP_SETPCAP to enable
Quoting Andrew G. Morgan (morgan@...nel.org):
> On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 8:48 PM, Michael Stone <michael@...top.org> wrote:
> > Andrew Morgan wrote:
> >>
> >> Please use CAP_NET_ADMIN for this feature (and add the corresponding
> >> comment in include/linux/capabilities.h).
> >
> > Sure.
> > However, to make sure I understand the purpose of the adjustment, would you
> > mind saying a word or two about what considerations cause you to recommend
> > CAP_NET_ADMIN instead of (or in addition to?) CAP_SETPCAP?
>
> If you take a look at the capabilities.h file, you'll see that each of
> the capabilities is preceded by an explanation of what privilege it
> enables.
>
> CAP_SETPCAP refers to privileged manipulation of capabilities
> (permission to violate the normal capability rules) and nothing to do
> with the network.
>
> You are adding something akin to a per-process tree firewall setting -
> deny/enable network access to this process.
I think I originally suggested CAP_SETPCAP - because it's not deny network
access to this process, but deny network access to all child processes as
well, even if they are more privileged (through setuid-root or file caps).
CAP_NET_ADMIN is probably more straightforward, though. Who's going to
think to add CAP_SETPCAP to a binary that is intended to drop network
perms, realistically...
> I think you'll agree that
> the CAP_NET_ADMIN description is a much better match for this.
I think it'll be more intuitive to most people so I agree.
-serge
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