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Message-ID: <20100324155423.68c3d5b6@bike.lwn.net>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 15:54:23 -0600
From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
To: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Mel Gorman <mel@....ul.ie>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>,
Adam Litke <agl@...ibm.com>, Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@...il.com>,
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@...fujitsu.com>,
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/11] Memory compaction core
On Wed, 24 Mar 2010 22:47:42 +0100
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com> wrote:
> I think you mistaken a VM_BUG_ON for a:
>
> if (could_be_null->something) {
> WARN_ON(1);
> return -ESOMETHING;
> }
>
> adding a VM_BUG_ON(inode->something) would _still_ be as exploitable
> as the null pointer deference, because it's a DoS. It's not really a
> big deal of an exploit but it _sure_ need fixing.
Ah, but that's the point: these NULL pointer dereferences were not DoS
vulnerabilities - they were full privilege-escalation affairs. Since
then, some problems have been fixed and some distributors have started
shipping smarter configurations. But, on quite a few systems a NULL
dereference still has the potential to be fully exploitable; if there's
a possibility of it happening I think we should test for it. A DoS is
a much better outcome...
jon
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