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Message-ID: <v2ocb0375e11004201837ib470c98dj9fea78d2d75799df@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2010 21:37:52 -0400
From: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] Taming execve, setuid, and LSMs
On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> On Mon, 2010-04-19 at 16:39 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski (luto@....edu):
>> > 1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
>> > them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
>> > them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
>> > question is well-written.
>>
>> hmm...
>>
>> A good point.
>
> At least in the case of SELinux, context transitions upon execve are
> already disabled in the nosuid case, and Eric's patch updated the
> SELinux test accordingly.
I don't see that code in current -linus, nor do I see where SELinux
affects dumpability. What's supposed to happen? I'm writing a patch
right now to clean this stuff up.
--Andy
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