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Message-ID: <20100421022546.GA23877@us.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2010 21:25:46 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
To: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] Taming execve, setuid, and LSMs
Quoting Andrew Lutomirski (luto@....edu):
> On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> > On Mon, 2010-04-19 at 16:39 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski (luto@....edu):
> >> > 1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on
> >> > them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating
> >> > them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in
> >> > question is well-written.
> >>
> >> hmm...
> >>
> >> A good point.
> >
> > At least in the case of SELinux, context transitions upon execve are
> > already disabled in the nosuid case, and Eric's patch updated the
> > SELinux test accordingly.
>
> I don't see that code in current -linus, nor do I see where SELinux
> affects dumpability. What's supposed to happen? I'm writing a patch
> right now to clean this stuff up.
check out security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_bprm_set_creds()
if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
I assume that's it?
-serge
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