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Message-ID: <4BD70921.1090209@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date:	Tue, 27 Apr 2010 10:56:17 -0500
From:	Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	Eric Sandeen <sandeen@...hat.com>
CC:	Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ecryptfs: disallow ecryptfs as underlying filesystem

On 04/24/2010 09:39 AM, Eric Sandeen wrote:
> Pekka Enberg wrote:
>> On Sat, Apr 24, 2010 at 5:41 AM, Eric Sandeen <sandeen@...hat.com> wrote:
>>> mounting stacked ecryptfs on ecryptfs has been shown to lead to bugs
>>> in testing.  For crypto info in xattr, there is no mechanism for handling
>>> this at all, and for normal file headers, we run into other trouble:
>>>
>>> BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
>>> IP: [<ffffffffa015b0b3>] ecryptfs_d_revalidate+0x43/0xa0 [ecryptfs]
>>> ...
>>>
>>> There doesn't seem to be any good usecase for this, so I'd suggest just
>>> disallowing the configuration.
>>
>> Maybe there's no good use case for it but it sure sounds like a good
>> test case for shaking out bugs in filesystem stacking code.
> 
> I could revise the patch to allow a force-override option if you're interested
> in doing that shaking.  :)
> 
> (for cryptinfo-in-xattr, though, there is simply no mechanism to support this
> at all in ecryptfs, and I doubt it's a design goal, though will defer to tyhicks
> on all this)
> 
> -Eric
> 

The xattr point is a good one.  Also, two rounds of file name encryption
would result in a lot of ENAMETOOLONG errors.  You're right about
eCryptfs on eCryptfs not being a design goal at this point.  Thanks for
the patch!

Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ecryptfs/ecryptfs-2.6.git#next

Tyler

>>> Based on a patch originally, I believe, from Mike Halcrow.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@...hat.com>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
>>> index af1a8f0..7ada044 100644
>>> --- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
>>> +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
>>> @@ -594,28 +594,46 @@ static int ecryptfs_get_sb(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
>>>                        struct vfsmount *mnt)
>>>  {
>>>        int rc;
>>> -       struct super_block *sb;
>>> +       struct super_block *sb, *lower_sb;
>>> +       struct nameidata nd;
>>> +
>>> +       rc = path_lookup(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &nd);
>>> +       if (rc) {
>>> +               printk(KERN_WARNING
>>> +                       "path_lookup() failed on dev_name = [%s]\n", dev_name);
>>> +               goto out;
>>> +       }
>>> +       lower_sb = nd.path.dentry->d_sb;
>>> +       if (strcmp(lower_sb->s_type->name, "ecryptfs") == 0) {
>>> +               rc = -EINVAL;
>>> +               printk(KERN_ERR "Mount on filesystem of type "
>>> +                       "eCryptfs explicitly disallowed due to "
>>> +                       "known incompatibilities\n");
>>> +               goto out_pathput;
>>> +       }
>>>
>>>        rc = get_sb_nodev(fs_type, flags, raw_data, ecryptfs_fill_super, mnt);
>>>        if (rc < 0) {
>>>                printk(KERN_ERR "Getting sb failed; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
>>> -               goto out;
>>> +               goto out_pathput;
>>>        }
>>>        sb = mnt->mnt_sb;
>>>        rc = ecryptfs_parse_options(sb, raw_data);
>>>        if (rc) {
>>>                printk(KERN_ERR "Error parsing options; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
>>> -               goto out_abort;
>>> +               goto out_dput;
>>>        }
>>>        rc = ecryptfs_read_super(sb, dev_name);
>>>        if (rc) {
>>>                printk(KERN_ERR "Reading sb failed; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
>>> -               goto out_abort;
>>> +               goto out_dput;
>>>        }
>>>        goto out;
>>> -out_abort:
>>> +out_dput:
>>>        dput(sb->s_root); /* aka mnt->mnt_root, as set by get_sb_nodev() */
>>>        deactivate_locked_super(sb);
>>> +out_pathput:
>>> +       path_put(&nd.path);
>>>  out:
>>>        return rc;
>>>  }
>>>
>>>
>>> --
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> 

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