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Message-Id: <201009141844.11080.dreibh@iem.uni-due.de>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2010 18:43:38 +0200
From: Thomas Dreibholz <dreibh@....uni-due.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Becke <martin.becke@...-due.de>
Subject: [PATCH] net: SCTP remote/local Denial of Service vulnerability description and fix
sctp_outq_flush() in net/sctp/outqueue.c may call sctp_packet_reset() on a
packet structure which has already been filled with chunks. sctp_packet_reset()
will not take care of the chunks in its list and only reset the packet length.
After that, the SCTP code assumes the packet to be re-initialized and adds
further chunks to the structure. The length will be wrong. When actually
trying to transmit the packet, the packet sk_buff structure may be exceeded
within sctp_packet_transmit(), resulting in skb_over_panic() => denial of
service.
Such a DoS can be triggered by a malicious remote SCTP instance, as follows:
- The remote endpoint has to use two paths (i.e. 2 IP addresses); easy to
achieve using an IPv4 address and an IPv6 address -> path A and B.
- The remote user has to trigger the transmission of a HEARTBEAT_ACK on path
A. This is trivial, by sending a HEARTBEAT chunk. sctp_outq_flush() will call
sctp_packet_config() for the packet on path A. The HEARTBEAT_ACK will be added
to this packet.
- The remote user has to trigger a DATA chunk retransmission on path B. This
is trivial, since it only has to send appropriate SACK chunks.
sctp_outq_flush() notices that the retransmission is on a different path and
calls sctp_packet_config() for the packet on path B. The DATA chunk to be
retransmitted is added to this packet.
- The local instance has to send another DATA chunk on path A. This depends on
the application, but should be easy to trigger from a remote instance.
sctp_outq_flush() notices that the path has changed again, and calls
sctp_packet_config() for the packet on path A. This resets the size of the
HEARTBEAT_ACK chunk, but the chunk remains in the packet. If
size(HEARTBEAT_ACK) + size(DATA) > MTU - overhead, the next call to
sctp_packet_transmit() causes the kernel panic => DoS.
In a similar way, the problem can also be triggered by a local user, having
only the permission to establish SCTP associations. Of course, the problem can
also occur during normal network operation, just by a retransmission at the
wrong time.
The patch below against 2.6.36-rc4 (git repository) fixes sctp_outq_flush() by
ensuring that the packet on each path is initialized only once. Furthermore, a
BUG_ON() statement ensures that further problems by calling
sctp_packet_reset() on packets with chunks are detected directly.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Dreibholz <dreibh@....uni-due.de>
---
diff --git a/net/sctp/output.c b/net/sctp/output.c
index a646681..744e667 100644
--- a/net/sctp/output.c
+++ b/net/sctp/output.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_will_fit(struct sctp_packet
*packet,
static void sctp_packet_reset(struct sctp_packet *packet)
{
+ BUG_ON(!list_empty(&packet->chunk_list));
packet->size = packet->overhead;
packet->has_cookie_echo = 0;
packet->has_sack = 0;
diff --git a/net/sctp/outqueue.c b/net/sctp/outqueue.c
index c04b2eb..69296c8 100644
--- a/net/sctp/outqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/outqueue.c
@@ -799,13 +799,13 @@ static int sctp_outq_flush(struct sctp_outq *q, int
rtx_timeout)
*/
if (new_transport != transport) {
transport = new_transport;
+ packet = &transport->packet;
if (list_empty(&transport->send_ready)) {
list_add_tail(&transport->send_ready,
&transport_list);
+ sctp_packet_config(packet, vtag,
+ asoc->peer.ecn_capable);
}
- packet = &transport->packet;
- sctp_packet_config(packet, vtag,
- asoc->peer.ecn_capable);
}
switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
@@ -900,15 +900,14 @@ static int sctp_outq_flush(struct sctp_outq *q, int
rtx_timeout)
/* Switch transports & prepare the packet. */
transport = asoc->peer.retran_path;
+ packet = &transport->packet;
if (list_empty(&transport->send_ready)) {
list_add_tail(&transport->send_ready,
&transport_list);
+ sctp_packet_config(packet, vtag,
+ asoc->peer.ecn_capable);
}
-
- packet = &transport->packet;
- sctp_packet_config(packet, vtag,
- asoc->peer.ecn_capable);
retran:
error = sctp_outq_flush_rtx(q, packet,
rtx_timeout, &start_timer);
@@ -970,6 +969,7 @@ static int sctp_outq_flush(struct sctp_outq *q, int
rtx_timeout)
/* Change packets if necessary. */
if (new_transport != transport) {
transport = new_transport;
+ packet = &transport->packet;
/* Schedule to have this transport's
* packet flushed.
@@ -977,15 +977,14 @@ static int sctp_outq_flush(struct sctp_outq *q, int
rtx_timeout)
if (list_empty(&transport->send_ready)) {
list_add_tail(&transport->send_ready,
&transport_list);
- }
+ sctp_packet_config(packet, vtag,
+ asoc->peer.ecn_capable);
- packet = &transport->packet;
- sctp_packet_config(packet, vtag,
- asoc->peer.ecn_capable);
- /* We've switched transports, so apply the
- * Burst limit to the new transport.
- */
- sctp_transport_burst_limited(transport);
+ /* We've switched transports, so apply the
+ * Burst limit to the new transport.
+ */
+ sctp_transport_burst_limited(transport);
+ }
}
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("sctp_outq_flush(%p, %p[%s]), ",
--
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