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Message-ID: <1295392422.1831.29.camel@dan>
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2011 18:13:42 -0500
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
To: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@...gle.com>, Li Zefan <lizf@...fujitsu.com>,
Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@...ibm.com>,
Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@...el.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@...achi.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
John Stultz <johnstul@...ibm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Switch proc interfaces in kernel/ to %pK
On Wed, 2011-01-19 at 00:52 +0200, Alexey Dobriyan wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 18, 2011 at 05:51:18PM -0500, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> > Switch users of %p in /proc interfaces in kernel/ to %pK, to allow
> > configuring the level of exposure of kernel pointers via the
> > kptr_restrict sysctl.
>
> > --- a/kernel/lockdep_proc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/lockdep_proc.c
>
> /proc/lockdep is r--------
> /proc/lockdep_chains is r--------
> /proc/lock_stat is rw-------
>
> Is this supposed to mean something?
It's certainly not a priority to switch these particular interfaces over
since they aren't exposed to unprivileged users. However, when
kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers aren't exposed at all, even
to root. Changing to %pK will certainly have no negative effect with
the default setting of 1 (hide when the reader does not have
CAP_SYSLOG).
Let me know if you're opposed and I can re-send a version that doesn't
touch these files.
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