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Message-ID: <20110125020450.GL4979@outflux.net>
Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2011 18:04:50 -0800
From: Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>,
Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@...driver.com>,
Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bjorn.helgaas@...com>,
Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
Changli Gao <xiaosuo@...il.com>,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] use %pK for /proc/kallsyms and /proc/modules
Instead of messing with permissions on these files, use %pK for kernel
addresses to reduce potential information leaks that might be used to
help target kernel privilege escalation exploits.
Note that this changes %x to %p, so some legitimately 0 values in
/proc/kallsyms will change from 00000000 to "(null)". Additionally, when
compiling with -Wformat, these harmless warnings are emitted:
warning: '0' flag used with ā%pā gnu_printf format
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>
---
kernel/kallsyms.c | 4 ++--
kernel/module.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/kallsyms.c b/kernel/kallsyms.c
index 6f6d091..074b762 100644
--- a/kernel/kallsyms.c
+++ b/kernel/kallsyms.c
@@ -477,11 +477,11 @@ static int s_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
*/
type = iter->exported ? toupper(iter->type) :
tolower(iter->type);
- seq_printf(m, "%0*lx %c %s\t[%s]\n",
+ seq_printf(m, "%0*pK %c %s\t[%s]\n",
(int)(2 * sizeof(void *)),
iter->value, type, iter->name, iter->module_name);
} else
- seq_printf(m, "%0*lx %c %s\n",
+ seq_printf(m, "%0*pK %c %s\n",
(int)(2 * sizeof(void *)),
iter->value, iter->type, iter->name);
return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 34e00b7..748465c 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -1168,7 +1168,7 @@ static ssize_t module_sect_show(struct module_attribute *mattr,
{
struct module_sect_attr *sattr =
container_of(mattr, struct module_sect_attr, mattr);
- return sprintf(buf, "0x%lx\n", sattr->address);
+ return sprintf(buf, "0x%pK\n", sattr->address);
}
static void free_sect_attrs(struct module_sect_attrs *sect_attrs)
@@ -3224,7 +3224,7 @@ static int m_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
mod->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING ? "Loading":
"Live");
/* Used by oprofile and other similar tools. */
- seq_printf(m, " 0x%p", mod->module_core);
+ seq_printf(m, " 0x%pK", mod->module_core);
/* Taints info */
if (mod->taints)
--
1.7.2.3
--
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team
--
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