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Message-Id: <E1Poiwb-0002rc-Lm@be1.7eggert.dyndns.org>
Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2011 21:53:21 +0100
From: Bodo Eggert
<arcoristkaputtundbrauchtdiesentext.7eggert@...fuerspam.de>
To: Michael Tokarev <mjt@....msk.ru>, "Daniel K." <dk@...no>,
Jesper Juhl <jj@...osbits.net>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-raid@...r.kernel.org, Neil Brown <neilb@...e.de>,
Neil Brown <neilb@....unsw.edu.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] md: Remove risk of overflow via sprintf) by using snprintf() in md_check_recovery()
Michael Tokarev <mjt@....msk.ru> wrote:
> 12.02.2011 12:34, Daniel K. wrote:
>> Jesper Juhl wrote:
>>> sprintf() is dangerous - given the wrong source string it will
>>> overflow the destination. snprintf() is safer in that at least we'll
>>> never overflow the destination. Even if overflow will never happen
>>> today, code changes over time and snprintf() is just safer in the long
>>> run.
>>
>>> - sprintf(nm,"rd%d", rdev->raid_disk);
>>> + snprintf(nm, sizeof(nm), "rd%d",
>>> rdev->raid_disk);
>>> sysfs_remove_link(&mddev->kobj, nm);
> C'mon guys, this is pointless. 20 bytes allocated for the device
> name, and this is for raid disk number. It is impossible to have
> more than 10^17 (20 bytes total, 2 for "rd" and on for the zero
> terminator) drives in a single array.
If you argue that you might get a buffer overflow, you'll have to check
for snprintf errors, too.
--
Logic: The art of being wrong with confidence...
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