Message-ID: <m1fwrm80ou.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org>
Date:	Thu, 17 Feb 2011 19:46:09 -0800
From:	ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc:	LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...l.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Kees Cook <kees.cook@...onical.com>,
	containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>, xemul@...allels.com,
	dhowells@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/9] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace.

"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com> writes:

> - Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
>   user namespace.
> - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
>   user namespace.
>
> The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
> namespaces.  It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
> only potential uid confusion issues left.
>
> I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
> think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.

Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>

>
> Changelog:
> 	11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
> 	12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
> 	Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
> 	capabilities to the user_ns he created.  THis is because we
> 	were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
> 	he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
> 	he was the creator.  Reverse those checks.
> 	12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
> 	01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
> 	01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
> 	02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
> 		    init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
> 		    it!  Fix the check in cap_capable().
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/capability.h |   10 ++++++++--
>  include/linux/security.h   |   25 ++++++++++++++-----------
>  kernel/capability.c        |   32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  security/apparmor/lsm.c    |    5 +++--
>  security/commoncap.c       |   40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  security/security.c        |   16 ++++++++++------
>  security/selinux/hooks.c   |   14 +++++++++-----
>  7 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index fb16a36..cb3d2d9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
>   *
>   * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
>   */
> -#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
> +#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0)
>  
>  /**
>   * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
> @@ -558,9 +558,15 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
>   * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
>   */
>  #define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) \
> -	(security_real_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
> +	(security_real_capable_noaudit((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0)
>  
> +struct user_namespace;
> +extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
>  extern int capable(int cap);
> +extern int ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> +extern int task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
> +
> +#define nsown_capable(cap) (ns_capable(current_user_ns(), (cap)))
>  
>  /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
>  struct dentry;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index b2b7f97..6bbee08 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -46,13 +46,14 @@
>  
>  struct ctl_table;
>  struct audit_krule;
> +struct user_namespace;
>  
>  /*
>   * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
>   * as the default capabilities functions
>   */
>  extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
> -		       int cap, int audit);
> +		       struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
>  extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
>  extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
>  extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
> @@ -1254,6 +1255,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
>   *	credentials.
>   *	@tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
>   *	@cred contains the credentials to use.
> + *      @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
>   *	@cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
>   *	@audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
>   *	Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
> @@ -1382,7 +1384,7 @@ struct security_operations {
>  		       const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
>  		       const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
>  	int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
> -			int cap, int audit);
> +			struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
>  	int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
>  	int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
>  	int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
> @@ -1662,9 +1664,9 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  		    const kernel_cap_t *effective,
>  		    const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
>  		    const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
> -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, int cap);
> -int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
> -int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
> +int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred, int cap);
> +int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> +int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>  int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
>  int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
>  int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
> @@ -1856,28 +1858,29 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new,
>  	return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, int cap)
> +static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns,
> +				   const struct cred *cred, int cap)
>  {
> -	return cap_capable(current, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> +	return cap_capable(current, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
> +static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
>  {
>  	int ret;
>  
>  	rcu_read_lock();
> -	ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> +	ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
>  static inline
> -int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
> +int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
>  {
>  	int ret;
>  
>  	rcu_read_lock();
> -	ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), cap,
> +	ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap,
>  			       SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
>  	return ret;
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index 9e9385f..916658c 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
>  #include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <linux/syscalls.h>
>  #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
>  
>  /*
> @@ -301,15 +302,42 @@ error:
>   */
>  int capable(int cap)
>  {
> +	return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
> +
> +/**
> + * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
> + * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
> + * @cap: The capability to be tested for
> + *
> + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
> + * available for use, false if not.
> + *
> + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
> + * assumption that it's about to be used.
> + */
> +int ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> +{
>  	if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
>  		printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
>  		BUG();
>  	}
>  
> -	if (security_capable(current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
> +	if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
>  		current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
>  		return 1;
>  	}
>  	return 0;
>  }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
> +
> +/*
> + * does current have capability 'cap' to the user namespace of task
> + * 't'.  Return true if it does, false otherwise.
> + */
> +int task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
> +{
> +	return ns_capable(task_cred_xxx(t, user)->user_ns, cap);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_ns_capable);
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index b7106f1..b37c2cd 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  #include <linux/ctype.h>
>  #include <linux/sysctl.h>
>  #include <linux/audit.h>
> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>  #include <net/sock.h>
>  
>  #include "include/apparmor.h"
> @@ -136,11 +137,11 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
>  }
>  
>  static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
> -			    int cap, int audit)
> +			    struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
>  {
>  	struct aa_profile *profile;
>  	/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
> -	int error = cap_capable(task, cred, cap, audit);
> +	int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit);
>  	if (!error) {
>  		profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
>  		if (!unconfined(profile))
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 64c2ed9..51fa9ec 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
>  #include <linux/prctl.h>
>  #include <linux/securebits.h>
> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>  
>  /*
>   * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
> @@ -68,6 +69,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
>   * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
>   * @tsk: The task to query
>   * @cred: The credentials to use
> + * @ns:  The user namespace in which we need the capability
>   * @cap: The capability to check for
>   * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
>   *
> @@ -79,10 +81,32 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
>   * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
>   * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
>   */
> -int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap,
> -		int audit)
> +int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
> +		struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
>  {
> -	return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
> +	for (;;) {
> +		/* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
> +		if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && targ_ns->creator == cred->user)
> +			return 0;
> +
> +		/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
> +		if (targ_ns == cred->user->user_ns)
> +			return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
> +
> +		/* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */
> +		if (targ_ns == &init_user_ns)
> +			return -EPERM;
> +
> +		/* If you have the capability in a parent user ns you have it
> +		 * in the over all children user namespaces as well, so see
> +		 * if this process has the capability in the parent user
> +		 * namespace.
> +		 */
> +		targ_ns = targ_ns->creator->user_ns;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* We never get here */
> +	return -EPERM;
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -177,7 +201,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
>  	/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
>  	 * capability
>  	 */
> -	if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
> +	if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
> +			current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
>  			SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
>  		return 0;
>  	return 1;
> @@ -829,7 +854,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
>  		     & (new->securebits ^ arg2))			/*[1]*/
>  		    || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))	/*[2]*/
>  		    || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))	/*[3]*/
> -		    || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
> +		    || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
> +				    current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
>  				    SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)		/*[4]*/
>  			/*
>  			 * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
> @@ -894,7 +920,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
>  {
>  	int cap_sys_admin = 0;
>  
> -	if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> +	if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
>  			SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
>  		cap_sys_admin = 1;
>  	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
> @@ -921,7 +947,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>  	int ret = 0;
>  
>  	if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
> -		ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
> +		ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
>  				  SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
>  		/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
>  		if (ret == 0)
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 7b7308a..7a6a0d0 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -154,29 +154,33 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  				    effective, inheritable, permitted);
>  }
>  
> -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, int cap)
> +int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
> +		     int cap)
>  {
> -	return security_ops->capable(current, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> +	return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap,
> +				     SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
>  }
>  
> -int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
> +int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
> +			  int cap)
>  {
>  	const struct cred *cred;
>  	int ret;
>  
>  	cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
> -	ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> +	ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
>  	put_cred(cred);
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> -int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
> +int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
> +				  struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
>  {
>  	const struct cred *cred;
>  	int ret;
>  
>  	cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
> -	ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> +	ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
>  	put_cred(cred);
>  	return ret;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index c8d6992..6dcda48 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
>  #include <linux/mutex.h>
>  #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
>  #include <linux/syslog.h>
> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>  
>  #include "avc.h"
>  #include "objsec.h"
> @@ -1423,6 +1424,7 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
>  /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
>  static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  			       const struct cred *cred,
> +			       struct user_namespace *ns,
>  			       int cap, int audit)
>  {
>  	struct common_audit_data ad;
> @@ -1851,15 +1853,15 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>   */
>  
>  static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
> -			   int cap, int audit)
> +			   struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
>  {
>  	int rc;
>  
> -	rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
> +	rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
>  	if (rc)
>  		return rc;
>  
> -	return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
> +	return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
>  }
>  
>  static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
> @@ -2012,7 +2014,8 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
>  {
>  	int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
>  
> -	rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> +	rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
> +			     &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
>  			     SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
>  	if (rc == 0)
>  		cap_sys_admin = 1;
> @@ -2829,7 +2832,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
>  	 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
>  	 * in-core context value, not a denial.
>  	 */
> -	error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
> +	error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
> +				&init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
>  				SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
>  	if (!error)
>  		error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
--
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