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Message-ID: <1299273034.2071.1417.camel@dan>
Date: Fri, 04 Mar 2011 16:10:34 -0500
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
To: Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>, cl@...ux-foundation.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Make /proc/slabinfo 0400
On Fri, 2011-03-04 at 22:58 +0200, Pekka Enberg wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 4, 2011 at 10:37 PM, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com> wrote:
> > This patch makes these techniques more difficult by making it hard to
> > know whether the last attacker-allocated object resides before a free or
> > allocated object. Especially with vulnerabilities that only allow one
> > attempt at exploitation before recovery is needed to avoid trashing too
> > much heap state and causing a crash, this could go a long way. I'd
> > still argue in favor of removing the ability to know how many objects
> > are used in a given slab, since randomizing objects doesn't help if you
> > know every object is allocated.
>
> So if the attacker knows every object is allocated, how does that help
> if we're randomizing the initial freelist?
If you know you've got a slab completely full of your objects, then it
doesn't matter that they happened to be allocated in a random fashion -
they're still all allocated, and by freeing one of them and
reallocating, you'll still be next to your target.
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