linux-kernel - Re: Linux capabilities shouldn't be lost during setuid to non-root from root or to another non-root uid from a non-root uid.

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <BANLkTi=kxpFkQ86ZGd2_q+XFRm-nVWzw4g@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Tue, 19 Apr 2011 00:02:17 +0900
From:	crocket <crockabiscuit@...il.com>
To:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Linux capabilities shouldn't be lost during setuid to non-root
 from root or to another non-root uid from a non-root uid.

I have several questions.

1) How do I set SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP?

2) Is there any reason to unset SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP by default?

On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 5:28 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com> wrote:
> Quoting crocket (crockabiscuit@...il.com):
>> I don't like the fact that an application should be linux-specific to
>> keep capabilities after setuid.
>> If users added capabilities to a file, they would know what they were
>> doing, and they would want applications to keep capabilities even
>> after setuid.
>
> Alternatively, you could call the program using a wrapper which first
> sets the SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP securebit, after which setuid would
> not trigger any capability changes.
>
> -serge
>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/