linux-kernel - Re: Linux capabilities shouldn't be lost during setuid to non-root from root or to another non-root uid from a non-root uid.

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20110418082838.GA30088@hallyn.com>
Date:	Mon, 18 Apr 2011 03:28:38 -0500
From:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To:	crocket <crockabiscuit@...il.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Linux capabilities shouldn't be lost during setuid to non-root
 from root or to another non-root uid from a non-root uid.

Quoting crocket (crockabiscuit@...il.com):
> I don't like the fact that an application should be linux-specific to
> keep capabilities after setuid.
> If users added capabilities to a file, they would know what they were
> doing, and they would want applications to keep capabilities even
> after setuid.

Alternatively, you could call the program using a wrapper which first
sets the SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP securebit, after which setuid would
not trigger any capability changes.

-serge
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/