Message-ID: <BANLkTi=5NYTM5T2LthVL+8kjQvYWwHSVPg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Thu, 28 Apr 2011 13:37:33 -0500
From:	Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
To:	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Cc:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	kees.cook@...onical.com, agl@...omium.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
	rostedt@...dmis.org, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...otime.net>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Tom Zanussi <tzanussi@...il.com>,
	Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/7] seccomp_filter: Document what seccomp_filter is and
 how it works.

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 9:56 AM, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 2011-04-28 at 09:06 +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>> * Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org> wrote:
>>
>> > +A collection of filters may be supplied via prctl, and the current set of
>> > +filters is exposed in /proc/<pid>/seccomp_filter.
>> > +
>> > +For instance,
>> > +  const char filters[] =
>> > +    "sys_read: (fd == 1) || (fd == 2)\n"
>> > +    "sys_write: (fd == 0)\n"
>> > +    "sys_exit: 1\n"
>> > +    "sys_exit_group: 1\n"
>> > +    "on_next_syscall: 1";
>> > +  prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, filters);
>> > +
>> > +This will setup system call filters for read, write, and exit where reading can
>> > +be done only from fds 1 and 2 and writing to fd 0.  The "on_next_syscall" directive tells
>> > +seccomp to not enforce the ruleset until after the next system call is run.  This allows
>> > +for launchers to apply system call filters to a binary before executing it.
>> > +
>> > +Once enabled, the access may only be reduced.  For example, a set of filters may be:
>> > +
>> > +  sys_read: 1
>> > +  sys_write: 1
>> > +  sys_mmap: 1
>> > +  sys_prctl: 1
>> > +
>> > +Then it may call the following to drop mmap access:
>> > +  prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, "sys_mmap: 0");
>>
>> Ok, color me thoroughly impressed
>
> Me too!
>
>> I've Cc:-ed Linus and Andrew: are you guys opposed to such flexible, dynamic
>> filters conceptually? I think we should really think hard about the actual ABI
>> as this could easily spread to more applications than Chrome/Chromium.

Would it make sense to start, as Frederic has pointed out, by using
the existing ABI - system call numbers - and not system call names?
We could leave name resolution to userspace as it is for all other
system call consumers now.  It might leave the interface for this
support looking more like:
  prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, _NR_mmap, "fd == 1");
  prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP_FILTER_APPLY, now|on_exec);

which may be less of a dramatic ABI change to start with.

> I'll definitely port QEMU to use this new interface rather than my more
> rigid flexible (haha "rigid flexible") seccomp.  I'll see if I run into
> any issues with this ABI in that porting...

Great - also let me know if you have a preference on the interface
Frederic proposed, as it might reduce the parsing footprint and
overall kernel-side complexity but add a little bit more burden on the
userspace side.

>> Btw., i also think that such an approach is actually the sane(r) design to
>> implement security modules: using such filters is far more flexible than the
>> typical LSM approach of privileged user-space uploading various nasty objects
>> into kernel space and implementing silly (and limited and intrusive) hooks
>> there, like SElinux and the other security modules do.
>
> Then you are wrong.  There's no question that this interface can provide
> great extensions to the current discretionary functionality provided by
> legacy security controls but if you actually want to mediate what tasks
> can do to other tasks or can do to arbitrary objects on the system this
> doesn't cut it.  Every system call that takes or uses a structure as an
> argument or that uses copy_from_user (for something other than just
> unparsed data) is uncontrollable.

I think it'd take a fair amount of additional work to turn pure system
call filtering into a robust policy engine (like systrace).  It seems
to me that right now, it would just be a great addition to the
existing LSM model by providing infrastructure the LSMs can use with
their higher level logic.  (Plumbing in all the bits to understand the
system call arguments completely and avoid time-of-check-time-of-use
attacks would be a sizable undertaking - and that's without making
sure the existing LSMs could live happily on top of it .)

> This approach is great and with careful coding of userspace apps can be
> made very useful in constraining those apps, but a replacement for
> mandatory access control it is not.
>
>> This approach also has the ability to become recursive (gets inherited by child
>> tasks, which could add their own filters) and unprivileged - unlike LSMs.
>
> LSMs have that ability.  There's nothing to prevent a module loading
> service to allow unpriv applications to further constrain themselves.
> It's just the different between DAC and MAC.  You are clearly a DAC guy,
> and there is no question this change is great in that mindset,  but you
> don't seem to understand either the flexibility of the LSM or the
> purpose of some of the modules implemented on top of the LSM.
>
>> I like this *a lot* more than any security sandboxing approach i've seen
>> before.
>
> I like this *a lot*.  It will be a HUGE addition to the security
> sandboxing approaches I've seen before.

Thanks!
will
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