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Message-ID: <20110527130731.GA8053@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 27 May 2011 09:07:31 -0400
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
davej@...hat.com, kees.cook@...onical.com, davem@...emloft.net,
eranian@...gle.com, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
adobriyan@...il.com, penberg@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, pageexec@...email.hu,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot
On Fri, May 27, 2011 at 11:38:53AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> > > Is it common to run kexec-tools as non-root? It may be necessary
> > > to restrict this interface to root when randomization is used
> > > (keep in mind nobody's going to force you to turn this on by
> > > default, at least for the foreseeable future).
> >
> > kexec-tools runs as root. And I see that /proc/iomem permissions
> > are also for root only. So it probably is a non-issue.
>
> it might be an issue to keep in mind for later projects that try to
> lock down root itself from being able to patch the kernel (other than
> rebooting the box), using signed modules, disabled direct-ioport
> access, and other hardened facilities.
For such environments, Eric Paris had posted a patch to be able to
disable loading of kexec/kdump kernel, similar to disabling module loading.
https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/1/19/412
I don't see that in Linus's tree. So looks like it never got committed.
Thanks
Vivek
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