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Message-ID: <4DDFDA22.205@zytor.com>
Date: Fri, 27 May 2011 10:06:42 -0700
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
davej@...hat.com, kees.cook@...onical.com, davem@...emloft.net,
eranian@...gle.com, adobriyan@...il.com, penberg@...nel.org,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, pageexec@...email.hu
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot
On 05/27/2011 10:00 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> The problem with your relinking solution is that a local attacker can
> easily figure out where the kernel is. So this does not protect
> against the more common break-in scenario.
>
There is another issue with it: it doesn't actually solve the real
problem other than suspend/resume, which is that the relocation agent
needs to understand what the memory space looks like at the time of boot.
I think something else we will need for this to be possible is initramfs
decoding directly from highmem, since the hack we're currently using to
deal with an initramfs/initrd located partly in highmem will break.
-hpa
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