[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20110527170045.GB4356@elte.hu>
Date: Fri, 27 May 2011 19:00:45 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
davej@...hat.com, kees.cook@...onical.com, davem@...emloft.net,
eranian@...gle.com, adobriyan@...il.com, penberg@...nel.org,
hpa@...or.com, Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, pageexec@...email.hu
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot
* Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> If you compile your own kernel version, you're already home free,
> and load-time randomization is pointless.
Most successful exploits work in two steps: first a local exploit
(weak password with a user, stupid script escaping bug, or a buffer
overflow somewhere), then a local kernel exploit to gain root and
kernel access. (for a rootkit and what not)
Straight remote root exploits are pretty rare - and per system
relinking only protects against that.
The problem with your relinking solution is that a local attacker can
easily figure out where the kernel is. So this does not protect
against the more common break-in scenario.
Kernel image randomization makes this last step really
indeterministic and thus dangerous to attackers.
Thanks,
Ingo
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists