linux-kernel - Re: Change in functionality of futex() system call.

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Message-ID: <BANLkTinyuHUGXACJYUT241g8rzg6AzPBiA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Tue, 7 Jun 2011 14:43:06 -0400
From:	Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>
To:	Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
Cc:	Darren Hart <dvhart@...ux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	David Oliver <david@...advisors.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@...advisors.com>,
	Zachary Vonler <zvonler@...advisors.com>,
	KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com>,
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Subject: Re: Change in functionality of futex() system call.

On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 11:58 AM, Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com> wrote:
> Le mardi 07 juin 2011 à 10:44 -0400, Andy Lutomirski a écrit :
>> On 06/06/2011 11:13 PM, Darren Hart wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On 06/06/2011 11:11 AM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>> >> Le lundi 06 juin 2011 à 10:53 -0700, Darren Hart a écrit :
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >>> If I understand the problem correctly, RO private mapping really doesn't
>> >>> make any sense and we should probably explicitly not support it, while
>> >>> special casing the RO shared mapping in support of David's scenario.
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >> We supported them in 2.6.18 kernels, apparently. This might sounds
>> >> stupid but who knows ?
>> >
>> >
>> > I guess this is actually the key point we need to agree on to provide a
>> > solution. This particular case "worked" in 2.6.18 kernels, but that
>> > doesn't necessarily mean it was supported, or even intentional.
>> >
>> > It sounds to me that we agree that we should support RO shared mappings.
>> > The question remains about whether we should introduce deliberate
>> > support of RO private mappings, and if so, if the forced COW approach is
>> > appropriate or not.
>> >
>>
>> I disagree.
>>
>> FUTEX_WAIT has side-effects.  Specifically, it eats one wakeup sent by
>> FUTEX_WAKE.  So if something uses futexes on a file mapping, then a
>> process with only read access could (if the semantics were changed) DoS
>> the other processes by spawning a bunch of threads and FUTEX_WAITing
>> from each of them.
>>
>> If there were a FUTEX_WAIT_NOCONSUME that did not consume a wakeup and
>> worked on RO mappings, I would drop my objection.
>
> If a group of cooperating processes uses a memory segment to exchange
> critical information, do you really think this memory segment will be
> readable by other unrelated processes on the machine ?

Depends on the design.

I have some software I'm working on that uses shared files and could
easily use futexes.  I don't want random read-only processes to
interfere with the futex protocol.

>
> How is this related to futex code ?

Because this usage is currently safe and would become unsafe with the
proposed change.

>
> Same problem for legacy IPC (shm, msg, sem) : Appropriate protections
> are needed, obviously.
>
> BTW, kernel/futex.c uses a global hash table (futex_queues[256]) and a
> very predictable hash_futex(), so its easy to slow down futex users...

There's a difference between slowing down users by abusing a kernel
hash and deadlocking users by eating a wakeup.  (If you eat a wakeup
the wakeup won't magically come back later.  It's gone.)

--Andy
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