linux-kernel - [PATCH] [96/99] proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io

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Message-Id: <20110727214936.0A8432403FF@tassilo.jf.intel.com>
Date:	Wed, 27 Jul 2011 14:49:36 -0700 (PDT)
From:	Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
To:	segoon@...nwall.com, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
	ak@...ux.intel.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	stable@...nel.org, tim.bird@...sony.com
Subject: [PATCH] [96/99] proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io

2.6.35-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>

[ upstream commit 1d1221f375c94ef961ba8574ac4f85c8870ddd51 ]

/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information.  E.g.  for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length.  Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.

ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.

Said to be CVE-2011-2495

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>

Index: linux-2.6.35.y/fs/proc/base.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.35.y.orig/fs/proc/base.c
+++ linux-2.6.35.y/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2514,6 +2514,9 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_
 	struct task_io_accounting acct = task->ioac;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	if (whole && lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
 		struct task_struct *t = task;
 
@@ -2636,7 +2639,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_
 	REG("coredump_filter", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_coredump_filter_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
-	INF("io",	S_IRUGO, proc_tgid_io_accounting),
+	INF("io",	S_IRUSR, proc_tgid_io_accounting),
 #endif
 };
 
@@ -2972,7 +2975,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_s
 	REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
-	INF("io",	S_IRUGO, proc_tid_io_accounting),
+	INF("io",	S_IRUSR, proc_tid_io_accounting),
 #endif
 };
 
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