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Message-ID: <20110913141412.GB7604@ucw.cz>
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2011 16:14:14 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
Cc: Nathan Lynch <ntl@...ox.com>, Oren Laadan <orenl@...columbia.edu>,
Daniel Lezcano <dlezcano@...ibm.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Glauber Costa <glommer@...allels.com>,
containers@...ts.osdl.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
LINUXFS-ML <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
James Bottomley <jbottomley@...allels.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] fs, proc: Introduce the /proc/<pid>/map_files/ directory
v2
Hi!
> This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains symlinks
> one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is vma->vm_start, the
> target is the file. Opening a symlink results in a file that point exactly
> to the same inode as them vma's one.
Is it good idea security-wise? It looks like symlink but does not
behave like one. (And yes, I know we already have similar problems in
/proc..)
ptrace-may-trace is not good enough protection; I can do this on my
own thread to get around read-only protection on fd. (File can be
protected from me by directory permissions.)
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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