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Message-ID: <4E6F66C8.5020406@parallels.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2011 18:20:56 +0400
From: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
CC: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>, Nathan Lynch <ntl@...ox.com>,
Oren Laadan <orenl@...columbia.edu>,
Daniel Lezcano <dlezcano@...ibm.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Glauber Costa <glommer@...allels.com>,
"containers@...ts.osdl.org" <containers@...ts.osdl.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
LINUXFS-ML <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
James Bottomley <jbottomley@...allels.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] fs, proc: Introduce the /proc/<pid>/map_files/ directory
v2
On 09/13/2011 06:14 PM, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
>
>> This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains symlinks
>> one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is vma->vm_start, the
>> target is the file. Opening a symlink results in a file that point exactly
>> to the same inode as them vma's one.
>
> Is it good idea security-wise? It looks like symlink but does not
> behave like one. (And yes, I know we already have similar problems in
> /proc..)
What exactly doesn't behave like symlink, can you elaborate, please?
> ptrace-may-trace is not good enough protection; I can do this on my
> own thread to get around read-only protection on fd. (File can be
> protected from me by directory permissions.)
I think this issue worth separate discussion and if it turns out there is
a problem with that we can fix it together with /proc/pid/fd and other stuff.
Thanks,
Pavel
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