[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20111017185526.GA9244@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2011 20:55:26 +0200
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Linux-mm <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@...achi.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@...ibm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Jim Keniston <jkenisto@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Roland McGrath <roland@...k.frob.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/X] uprobes: reimplement xol_add_vma() via
install_special_mapping()
On 10/17, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>
> > Since selinux wasnt happy to have an anonymous vma attached, we would
> > create a pseudo file using shmem_file_setup. However after comments from
> > Peter and Stephan's suggestions we started using override_creds. Peter and
> > Oleg suggest that we use install_special_mapping.
> >
> > Are you okay with using install_special_mapping instead of
> > override_creds()?
>
> That's fine with me.
Good.
> But I'm still not clear on how you are controlling
> the use of this facility from userspace, which is my primary concern.
Yes, but just in case... Any security check in xol_add_vma() is pointless.
The task is already "owned" by uprobes when xol_add_vma() is called.
Oleg.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists