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Message-ID: <20111029063409.GB2207@suse.de>
Date: Sat, 29 Oct 2011 08:34:09 +0200
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...e.de>
To: KY Srinivasan <kys@...rosoft.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"devel@...uxdriverproject.org" <devel@...uxdriverproject.org>,
"virtualization@...ts.osdl.org" <virtualization@...ts.osdl.org>,
"ohering@...e.com" <ohering@...e.com>,
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] Staging: hv: Move the mouse driver out of staging
On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 08:28:11PM +0000, KY Srinivasan wrote:
> > > The guest cannot survive a malicious host; so I think it is safe to say that the
> > > guest can assume the host is following the protocol.
> >
> > That's not good for a very large number of reasons, not the least being
> > that we have no idea how secure the hyperv hypervisor is, so making it
> > so that there isn't an obvious hole into linux through it, would be a
> > good idea.
> >
> > And yes, I'd say the same thing if this was a KVM or Xen driver as well.
> > Please be very defensive in this area of the code, especially as there
> > are no performance issues here.
>
> In the chain of trust, the hypervisor and the host are the foundations
> as far as the guest is concerned, since both the hypervisor and the host
> can affect the guest in ways that the guest has no obvious way to protect itself.
That's true.
> If the hypervisor/host have security holes, there is not much you can do in the guest
> to deal with it.
> In this case, I can add checks but I am not sure how useful it is.
I would prefer to see them here, just to be safe, it can not hurt,
right?
greg k-h
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