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Message-ID: <20111211182821.GA2853@albatros>
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2011 22:28:21 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH -next] proc: fix task_struct infoleak
proc_pid_permission() doesn't put task_struct on every /proc/$pid/
access. A demo from Hugh Dickins:
while :; do ps; grep KernelStack /proc/meminfo; sleep 1; done
Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
---
This is a patch against a hidepid patchset from -mm.
fs/proc/base.c | 9 +++++++--
1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 8caf5cb..0e5c577 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -646,9 +646,14 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid,
static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
struct pid_namespace *pid = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
- struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ int has_perms;
+
+ task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 1);
+ put_task_struct(task);
- if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 1)) {
+ if (!has_perms) {
if (pid->hide_pid == 2) {
/*
* Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open()
--
1.7.0.4
--
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