linux-kernel - Re: [patch 1/4] Add routine for generating an ID for kernel pointer

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Date:	Fri, 30 Dec 2011 15:31:32 -0500
From:	KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@...il.com>
To:	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
CC:	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
	Glauber Costa <glommer@...allels.com>,
	Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
	Matt Helsley <matthltc@...ibm.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
	Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
	Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [patch 1/4] Add routine for generating an ID for kernel pointer

(12/30/11 2:36 AM), Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 30, 2011 at 11:23:09AM +1100, Herbert Xu wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 08:24:53PM +0400, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
>>>
>>> Probably I've had to crypto_alloc_hash earlier and simply keep a reference
>>> to algo but since I'm not sure if looking for modules in late-init-call
>>> is good idea.
>>
>> Right, the allocation needs to occur in a sleepable context.
>>
>> If you're just hashing something small and have no need for
>> hardware acceleration then lib/sha1.c is fine.
>>
>
> Hi, yeah, it's just one message block hashing so I've switched
> to lib/sha1.c. Herbert, I'm more interested in security analysis
> -- would the sha1(msg), where the 'msg' is the kernel pointer
> XOR'ed with random value and expanded to the 512 bits would be
> safe enough for export to unprivilege users?

Even if now we don't know an attacking way of sha1 reverse hashing,
we may discover within 10 years. Many secure messages lost from hardware 
speedup and new algorithm attack. so, nobody can say it's abi safe.

And, if you don't use perfect hash, you may have a hash collision risk. 
What's happen if different pointer makes same ID?
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