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Message-ID: <20111230073655.GE4806@moon>
Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2011 11:36:55 +0400
From: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
Glauber Costa <glommer@...allels.com>,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Matt Helsley <matthltc@...ibm.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [patch 1/4] Add routine for generating an ID for kernel pointer
On Fri, Dec 30, 2011 at 11:23:09AM +1100, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 08:24:53PM +0400, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> >
> > Probably I've had to crypto_alloc_hash earlier and simply keep a reference
> > to algo but since I'm not sure if looking for modules in late-init-call
> > is good idea.
>
> Right, the allocation needs to occur in a sleepable context.
>
> If you're just hashing something small and have no need for
> hardware acceleration then lib/sha1.c is fine.
>
Hi, yeah, it's just one message block hashing so I've switched
to lib/sha1.c. Herbert, I'm more interested in security analysis
-- would the sha1(msg), where the 'msg' is the kernel pointer
XOR'ed with random value and expanded to the 512 bits would be
safe enough for export to unprivilege users?
Cyrill
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