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Message-Id: <1325619731-13936-1-git-send-email-haogangchen@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:42:11 -0500
From: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@...il.com>
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>,
Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@...rix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@...ts.xensource.com,
virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Haogang Chen <haogangchen@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH] XEN: xenbus: integer overflow in process_msg()
There is a potential integer overflow in process_msg() that could result
in cross-domain attack.
body = kmalloc(msg->hdr.len + 1, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);
When a malicious guest passes 0xffffffff in msg->hdr.len, the subsequent
call to xb_read() would write to a zero-length buffer. This causes
kernel oops in the receiving guest and hangs its xenbus kernel thread.
The patch returns -EINVAL in that case.
Signed-off-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@...il.com>
---
drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c | 6 ++++++
1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c
index ede860f..e32aefb 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c
@@ -801,6 +801,12 @@ static int process_msg(void)
goto out;
}
+ if (msg->hdr.len == UINT_MAX) {
+ kfree(msg);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
body = kmalloc(msg->hdr.len + 1, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);
if (body == NULL) {
kfree(msg);
--
1.7.5.4
--
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