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Message-ID: <CALCETrWCkX8DVRdyO5TEdeaobnW_+ic0OL7+8L6JeWwBcapNNw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2012 13:57:47 -0800
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Colin Walters <walters@...bum.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Jamie Lokier <jamie@...reable.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
keescook@...omium.org, john.johansen@...onical.com,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, unshare, and chroot
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 1:47 PM, Colin Walters <walters@...bum.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 2012-01-16 at 13:25 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
>> The MS_NOSUID semantics are somewhat ridiculous for selinux,
>
> I don't see how they're ridiculous.
exec_sid is silently ignored. So runcon will not switch context but
will still appear to succeed.
>
>> and I'd
>> rather not make them match for no_new_privs.
>
> Note your patch for selinux does exactly the same thing in the NOSUID
> case and your NO_NEW_PRIVS flag. Right?
>
> - if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
> + if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
> + (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
> new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
>
See several lines up.
>
>> AppArmor completely
>> ignores MS_NOSUID,
>
> Ugh...well, I guess if it doesn't store any security data associated
> with files, only with file names, then there's nothing for it to do.
Nope. It looks it up by file name or path, I think.
> Like I said before though, I think SELinux is the only sane LSM.
I think the fact that there is a bprm_set_creds hook at all is insane,
but maybe that's just me. I think this is one of the things that
Windows does far better than POSIX. On Windows, CreateProcess (the
moral equivalent of execve) never gains privileges.
--Andy
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