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Message-ID: <20120117162309.GA16336@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 17:23:09 +0100
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Jamie Lokier <jamie@...reable.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
keescook@...omium.org, john.johansen@...onical.com,
serge.hallyn@...onical.com, coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
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linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
On 01/15, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs. If no_new_privs,
> then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot.
>
> ...
>
> + if (!(current->no_new_privs && !is_chrooted) &&
> + !capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
I must have missed something. How no_new_privs can help if fs->users != 1 ?
Oleg.
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