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Message-ID: <4F21CC40.3030207@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2012 13:57:20 -0800
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>
CC: apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, draht@...e.com
Subject: Re: security_path hooks for xattr
On 01/26/2012 04:45 AM, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> Forwarding from an internal bug report:
>
> "AppArmor does not mediate the xattr system calls for confined processes.
>
> As a consequence, a confined process can cross the confinement privilege
> boundary by reading or writing to extended attributes that the confined
> task should not have access to. The restrictions for security and user
> attributes read and write still apply according to DAC; however, this
> does not comply with the claim of AppArmor to mediate fipe
> operations. The use of extended attributes is very flexible, so that the
> effect of a missing mediation can lead to false assumptions in
> subsequent policy decisions (eCryptfs)."
>
> AFAIU this boils down to missing security hooks in *xattr().
>
> Would it be possible to add these hooks?
>
right, this is something we lost when we moved to the security_path hooks and
while we have spent some time looking at the problem, we haven't addressed it
yet.
New hooks would certainly be the easiest solution. I looked at it back when
I initially did the port, and considered proposing new hooks at the time, but
for various reasons it was decided to separate that from the main apparmor
submission, and I haven't had a chance to revisit this since.
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