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Message-Id: <20120227144602.07f5ec33.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 14:46:02 -0800
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...el.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tmpfs: security xattr setting on inode creation
On Fri, 24 Feb 2012 19:19:22 -0800 (PST)
Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com> wrote:
> +/*
> + * Callback for security_inode_init_security() for acquiring xattrs.
> + */
> +static int shmem_initxattrs(struct inode *inode,
> + const struct xattr *xattr_array,
> + void *fs_info)
> +{
> + struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
> + const struct xattr *xattr;
> + struct shmem_xattr *new_xattr;
> + size_t len;
> +
> + for (xattr = xattr_array; xattr->name != NULL; xattr++) {
> + new_xattr = shmem_xattr_alloc(xattr->value, xattr->value_len);
> + if (!new_xattr)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + len = strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
> + new_xattr->name = kmalloc(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN + len,
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!new_xattr->name) {
> + kfree(new_xattr);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> +
> + memcpy(new_xattr->name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN);
> + memcpy(new_xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
> + xattr->name, len);
> +
> + spin_lock(&info->lock);
> + list_add(&new_xattr->list, &info->xattr_list);
> + spin_unlock(&info->lock);
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
So if there's a kmalloc failure partway through the array, we leave a
partially xattrified inode in place.
Are we sure this is OK?
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