[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAOPLpQeJPxD4uVncY5tcheTizZzZ1xbWfwm1BKTqXMH56FP_3w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2012 07:37:37 -0400
From: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@...il.com>
To: Kyle Moffett <kyle@...fetthome.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] nextfd(2)
On Sun, Apr 1, 2012 at 21:19, Kyle Moffett <kyle@...fetthome.net> wrote:
> Well, I imagine one typical usecase for closing all FDs is for
> security isolation purposes (EG: chroot()+etc),
chroot and security in the same sentence...?
> and in a great deal of
> chroot environments you don't have /proc available. In particular
> /proc has been a source of a lot of privilege escalations in the past,
> so avoiding mounting it in a chroot is good security policy if
> possible.
The problem is that the kernel exports quite a bit of information only
through the /proc and /sys filesystems. I might try to finish my
comprehensive list of functionality depending on /proc sometime soon.
The list is quite long.
Not mounting /proc is inconvenient at best, it renders the environment
unusable quite often and in some cases is outright insecure.. I don't
think you can use not mounting /proc as an argument. And, as Peter
said, the loop over the directory content is quite efficient.
If you want to avoid /proc I suggest you first work on removing the
dependencies. Of just secure /proc itself.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists