linux-kernel - Re: [REVIEW][PATCH 0/43] Completing the user namespace

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Message-ID: <CAFLxGvwHtA028V2XudM-5HXmXCPw5ENL5E_nHKZh_gbrsRV69g@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Mon, 9 Apr 2012 00:04:56 +0200
From:	richard -rw- weinberger <richard.weinberger@...il.com>
To:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>
Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH 0/43] Completing the user namespace

On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
> richard -rw- weinberger <richard.weinberger@...il.com> writes:
>
>> On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 7:10 AM, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
>>> - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making
>>>  it safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.
>>>
>>
>> So, this makes LXC and friends ready for hostile environments?
>> IOW a root user (with all capabilities) sitting in his own namespace can no
>> longer ham the host?
>
> The user namespace now restricts the root user in a container to being
> able to do no more harm than any other user can do.  Additionally suid
> executables can no longer lead to having all power on the system.  Which
> means that the only privilege escalation attacks available from a
> container require kernel bugs.
>
> With my version of user namespaces you no longer have to worry about the
> container root writing to files in /proc or /sys and changing the
> behavior of the system.  Nor do you have to worry about messages passed
> across unix domain sockets to d-bus having a trusted uid and being
> allowed to do something nasty.
>
> It allows for applications with no capabilities to use multiple
> uids and to implement privilege separation.
>
> I certainly see user namespaces like this as having the potential
> to make linux systems more secure.
>
> You will have to make your own threat assessment to decide if that is
> enough of an improvement to start deploying containers in what you
> consider hostile environments.
>
>
>
> For me the big potential I see is that it makes possible the creation of
> a container without privilege (today the uid mapping setup still
> requires privilege), and it allows a lot of things that the existence of
> suid root executables has prevented us from making unprivileged before.
>
> After the core is settled we can start looking at patches to allow
> unprivileged creation of other namespaces.  Unprivileged mounts.
> Unprivileged use of the networking stack.  Bringing many of the
> improvements that linux has seen over the years to unprivileged
> users.
>
> I also see great potential for April fools day jokes.  You log in and
> try to fix something and discover you are not the root you thought you
> were.  Does that count as a hostile environment?
>

Yep. Sounds great!
I'll give your patch set a try within the next few days on my LXC testbed. :-)

-- 
Thanks,
//richard
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